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J URISDICTION 
The basis for thi s court's jurisdiction I s set forth i n 
Roberts 1 petition. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
Ru ] e 4,3(4) Rules of t-i^ Ut..- ' jp: i _ _ . • 
Review by a writ of certiorari is u , mattei 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be t m j 
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character of reasons tha/ ; l1 • re n<=,: dr-rr-d : 
(4) Whei I the C o u n oi Appeals Lab - an important 
question of rn.unici.pal, state, or f*- . <** v:} * ch has 
not been, but should be, settled L2 s coai_. 
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2. Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 55, 56 
and 57 n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Issues not raised in the trial court in a timely 
fashion are deemed waived, precluding this court from 
considering their merits on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the Roberts' use of their agriculturally 
zoned property, on which they reside in Centerville City, Utah, 
to store approximately thirty junked or inoperable motor 
vehicles. Pursuant to its ordinances which prohibit such use of 
property within the City limits, Centerville City pursued civil 
and criminal avenues of relief in its efforts to obtain ordinance 
compliance and removal of the motor vehicles. 
Petitioners refuse and still refuse to remove the junked or 
inoperable motor vehicles from their property claiming the 
vehicles constitute a prior nonconforming use exempting them from 
Centerville's ordinances.1 (Petition, at 4). Twelve years 
before petitioners even purchased their property, however, 
Centerville Ordinances precluded the storage of junked, 
inoperable or partially dismantled motor vehicles. (Petition, 
xIn the district court and Court of Appeals, petitioners 
also asserted the storage of junked or inoperable motor vehicles 
constituted a valid agricultural accessory use to their residence 
in an agricultural zone. (Petition, Appendix "A" at 2.) Both 
courts denied the claim as a matter of law and petitioners do not 
raise the issue in their petition for a writ of certiorari. 
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Appendix "D" at 6).2 Such storage is still prohibited to this 
date. 
Using the same flawed nonconforming use argument, the 
Roberts filed a complaint to enjoin the City's use of criminal 
prosecutions to obtain removal of the dismantled and inoperable 
motor vehicles. (Petition, Appendix "A" at 1). 
While that case was pending, the Roberts submitted to 
Centerville1s zoning administrator an affidavit declaring the use 
of their property for junked vehicle storage to be a valid prior 
nonconforming use. The zoning administrator disagreed. 
Petitioners appealed to the City's Board of Adjustment which 
affirmed the decision since City ordinances precluded Roberts1 
use twelve years before they purchased the property. (Petition, 
Appendix "A" at 1-2). In a separate complaint, petitioners 
appealed the Board's decision pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-9-15 as arbitrary and capricious.3 That complaint was 
subsequently amended, adding allegations that Roberts' use of 
2
 In 1952, Centerville City defined "junk yard" as "the use 
of any lot . . . for the storage, keeping or abandonment of junk, 
including . . . the dismantling, demolition or abandonment of 
automobiles, or other vehicles . . . or parts thereof." 
(Petition, Appendix "D" at 2). Junk yards are not a permitted 
use in the zone in which Petitioners' property is located. (Id. 
at 6) . 
3Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-15 provides in part: 
The city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the 
Board of Adjustment may have and maintain a plenary 
action for relief therefrom in any court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
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their property constituted a valid prior nonconforming use and 
the Board lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a noncon-
forming use existed. (Petition, Appendix "AM at 2). 
The Roberts then amended their original complaint to enjoin 
further criminal enforcement by adding the same nonconforming use 
argument as a basis for a declaratory judgment. 
Because both complaints centered on whether petitioners 
possessed a valid prior nonconforming use, the parties stipulated 
to their consolidation. (Petition, Appendix "A" at 2). 
Petitioners then filed a "Second Amended Complaint1' in the 
consolidated action setting forth, for purposes of this Petition, 
only three issues: whether the Roberts possessed a nonconforming 
use, whether the Board of Adjustment acted arbitrarily in denying 
petitioners1 request for recognition of a nonconforming use, and 
whether the board lacked jurisdiction to determine the existence 
of a nonconforming use. (Petition, Appendix "A" at 2). 
Together with an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint, 
respondents filed a counterclaim requesting a judicial declara-
tion that Roberts1 use of their property did not constitute a 
nonconforming use and an injunction mandating removal of the 
vehicles. Simultaneously, respondents moved to dismiss the 
Second Amended Complaint and for summary judgment on the counter-
claim. After complete briefing and a hearing on December 13, 
1989, the district court granted respondents1 motions in full 
ruling that a nonconforming use did not exist, the "Board of 
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Adjustment had authority to act and [its] decision was reason-
able" and ordered immediate removal of the vehicles. (Petition, 
Appendix "A" at 3). 
Just prior to petitioners1 notice of appeal, their counsel 
of record withdrew. One of the petitioners, J. Val Roberts, an 
attorney himself, then filed the notice of appeal and docketing 
statement pro se. (Exhs. 1 & 2 to this Brief). The issues 
raised on appeal, however, far exceeded those pursued before the 
district court. For example, petitioners asserted for the first 
time denial of access to the courts, a claim under recent amend-
ments to the Horseless Carriage Act, facial challenges to 
Centerville1s ordinances, as well as allegations of equal 
protection violations, a "selective prosecution" claim, improper 
ordinance enforcement motives, violation of the Junk Yard Control 
Act and the separation of powers doctrine. (Exhibit 2 to this 
Brief). 
Because most of the issues on appeal were not raised in the 
trial court and thus waived, and it is frivolous to assert a 
prior nonconforming use exists when the use was prohibited twelve 
years prior to purchase of the property, respondents moved for 
summary affirmance pursuant to Rule 10(a)(2), Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. The motion was fully briefed and assigned to the 
Court of Appeals which granted it on May 2, 1990. (Petition, 
Appendix "A"). It is from that decision which petitioners seek a 
writ of certiorari. 
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The Court of Appeals held that "even construing the facts in 
the light most favorable to [petitioners] we can identify no 
genuine factual dispute about the use of the property." 
(Petition, Appendix "A" at 5). "It is undisputed that 
[petitioners] purchased their property after the enactment of the 
zoning ordinance and thus cannot claim a prior nonconforming 
use." Id.4 
The Roberts now petition this court pursuant to Rules 42-
48, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, for a writ of certiorari to 
the Court of Appeals. They allege their petition "raises impor-
tant constitutional questions under both the Utah and the United 
States Constitutions." (Petition, at 7.) Those important 
constitutional questions are whether the court of appeals erred 
in affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in spite 
of (1) the nineteen year old newspaper article referencing 
another district court decision which petitioners provided the 
Court of Appeals but not the district court, (Petition, Exhibit 
4The Court of Appeals also affirmed the district courtfs 
finding that as a matter of law petitioners did not possess a 
valid agricultural accessory use either. Again this issue is not 
raised in the petition. Nonetheless, it is undisputed in the 
record that an accessory use did not exist. To be a permissible 
accessory use, the storage of inoperable motor vehicles must be 
customarily incidental to the "main use" of the property which 
must be agricultural. The record indicates the main use peti-
tioners make of their property is residential. In addition, 
petitioners keep a few "cattle, pigs and chicken," (Petition, at 
17), but the "keeping or raising of domestic animals and fowl" is 
excluded from the ordinance's definition of agriculture. 
(Petition, Appendix "D" at 1). 
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"F") and (2) the April 23, 1990 enactment of statutes providing 
for the issuance of "optional certificates of title" for "collec-
tor motor vehicles." (Petition, Exhibit "E.") The third impor-
tant constitutional question is whether the Court of Appeals 
erred by "failing to recognize," even though it was not raised in 
the trial court, the alleged improper motives of respondents in 
enforcing their ordinances. The fourth question asserts the 
Court of Appeals should have required the trial court to inter-
rogate counsel regarding allegedly disputed facts, none of which 
are material, even though the trial court rendered its decision 
as a matter of law based on undisputed facts. 
ARGUMENT 
PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO IDENTIFY ANY 
SPECIAL REASONS OR IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF LAW 
WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE EXERCISE OF THIS 
COURT'S DISCRETION IN REVIEWING THE DECISION 
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS BY A WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI. 
Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, allows review of a 
judicial decision "only when there are special and important 
reasons therefor." One such reason, which petitioners here 
advance, is "when the Court of Appeals has decided an important 
question of municipal, state or federal law which has not, but 
should be, settled by this Court." A review of the record below, 
however, establishes that this case fails to present any "special 
or important" questions of law which should be decided by this 
court. 
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First, the Court of Appeals did not decide "an important 
question of municipal, state or federal law." It merely affirmed 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment to respondents. The 
Roberts premised their entire case in the trial court on the 
existence of a nonconforming use or an agricultural accessory 
use. The district court record indicates there were no disputed 
issues of material fact and judgment on those issues as a matter 
of law was warranted. The Roberts purchased their property after 
the ordinances in question were enacted and the main use of their 
property is residential, not agricultural. 
Second, any other issues presented to the Court of Appeals 
or this Court are raised for the first time and are therefore 
impermissible bases of review. "It is axiomatic that . . . 
issues not raised in the trial court in a timely fashion are 
deemed waived, precluding this court from considering their 
merits on appeal." Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 111 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 55, 56 and 57 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Berqer v. Minnesota 
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1986). 
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final 
settlement of controversies, requires that a party must 
present his entire case and his theory or theories to 
the trial court; and having done so, he cannot there-
after change to some different theory and thus attempt 
to keep in motion a merry-go-round of litigation. 
Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 470 P.2d 399, 401 (Utah 1970). 
In petitioners1 first question, they assert the trial court 
and the Court of Appeals decisions are in direct conflict with a 
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1971 district court decision. The alleged decision and the 
newspaper article referencing the decision, even if properly 
portrayed by petitioners, were never raised until consideration 
by the Court of Appeals. 
The second question presented by petitioners claims several 
statutes with an effective date of April 23, 1990 and no refer-
ence to being retroactive, permit, "by implication," petitioners 
to store any number of collectable motor vehicles they like on 
their property without government regulation. Again assuming 
petitioners1 characterization of the statutes to be accurate, the 
argument was not made, and cannot be made because of the effec-
tive date, to the district court or the Court of Appeals.5 
Petitioners1 third question proposed for review is whether 
the Court of Appeals improperly failed to recognize respondents1 
alleged improper motives in enforcing Centerville1s zoning 
ordinances. The Court of Appeals did not decide the issue 
because it was not presented to the trial court. (Petitioners, 
Appendix "A" at 3). 
The fourth issue purporting to justify a writ of certiorari 
is the failure of the Court of Appeals to require the trial court 
Petitioners' second question also asserts that federal 
takings and equal protection laws are implicated in this matter. 
A federal takings claim was initiated in one of Roberts' original 
complaints dated January 13, 1988. That complaint was subse-
quently amended on October 4, 1989 and the takings claim was 
dropped and never resurrected. None of the complaints have ever 
raised an equal protection claim. 
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to interrogate counsel regarding any possible issues of fact, 
even though it decided the case as a matter of law and on undis-
puted facts. Not only was this issue not raised before the trial 
court, but it was not presented to the Court of Appeals either. 
Finally, none of the issues raised in the petition are 
meritorious. The 1971 district court decision relied on by the 
Roberts exists only in the form of a newspaper article which 
distinguishes itself from the present matter. The automobile 
collector in the article purchased his property and began storing 
vehicles in 1941, sixteen years prior to the effective date of 
the zoning ordinances enforced against him. (Petition, Appendix 
fIF"). The Roberts began their collecting after the zoning 
ordinances in question took effect. 
The 1990 statutes relied on by petitioners also fail to 
support their claims. Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-1-195-198 only 
provide that collector motor vehicles may be titled in a form 
different than other motor vehicles. They do not, as argued by 
the Roberts, allow collectors to store any number of motor 
vehicles on their property without government regulation. A 
municipality's police power allows it to regulate the use to 
which real property within its limits is put. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-9-1. 
It is also irrelevant that the trial court did not inquire 
of trial counsel whether any facts were in dispute. It was 
undisputed that petitioners purchased their property after the 
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storage of inoperable motor vehicles was prohibited in 
Centerville, and the main use of Roberts1 property was residen-
tial. As a matter of law then, petitioners did not possess a 
nonconforming use or an agricultural accessory use. Furthermore, 
petitioners did not file a 56(f) affidavit with the district 
court stating the need for additional discovery. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondents respectfully request 
that the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari be denied. 
DATED this SOKday of \&AL\^ 1990. 
SNOW/CHftlSTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By K / ^wiJ^ 
Jody Kf Burmett 
Daniel D. Hill 
Attorneys for Respondents 
DDH318 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of July, 1990, I 
caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing to be served 
by first-class mail, postage prepaid, on counsel for plaintiffs 
as follows: 
J. Val Roberts, Pro Se 
P. 0. Box 666 
Centerville, UT 84014 
DATED this Ijf/Ntay of July, 1990 
Jody 




J. Val Roberts 62772 
Attorney Pro Se and 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Verle Roberts 
P. 0. Box 666 
Centerville, Utah 84014 
Telephone (801) 295-9003 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J. VAL ROBERTS and : 
VERLE ROBERTS, : 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
P l a i n t i f f s , : 
vs. : 
CENTERVILLE CITY, CENTERVILLE 
CITY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, and : 
NANCY H. GROLL, Chairman of 
the Centerville City Board of : 
Adjustment, WILLIAM WINGO, NORM : 
WRIGHT, FRED NELSON, and DALE : 
REES, members of the Centerville : Civil No. §9-0903165 
City Board of Adjustment, : 
: The Honorable David Roth 
Defendants- : 
C0ME5 NOW J. VAL ROBERTS, attorney at law, and gives notice, 
in accordance with Rule 3d of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, 
that he, appearing as a pro se PIaintiff/Appellant and as counsel 
for his wife, VERLE ROBERTS, Co-Plaintiff and Appellant, does 
appeal from the final order of the HONORABLE DAVID ROTH entered 
January 2, 1990, granting Defendants, the CITY OF CENTERVILLE, 
UTAH'S Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing the Plaintiffs-
action against the Defendants for an unlawful taking of real 
property in connection with Plaintiffs* prior existing, 
nonconforming use and from the final order affirming a like action 
of the BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT'S alleged right to determine a 
EXHIBIT 1 
none on-forming use thereby denying Plaintiffs access to judicial 
review by evidentiary hearing and permitting the Defendants to 
take a portion of Plamtiffs" real property without compensation 
in violation of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the 
Fifth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution. 
The Court's final order granting Defendants summary judgment 
places the Weber County Division of the Second District Court in 
direct conflict with an 18-year-old decision of the Davis County 
Division of the Second District Court which established a 
nonconforming use in circumstances squarely on all fours with the 
facts in the case at bar. 
Dated this 26th day of January, 1990. 
J. VAL ROBERTS 
Attorney at Law 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, postage prepaid, this _26th_ day of 
January, 1990, to the following: Jody Burnett and Daniel D. Hill, 
Attorneys for Defendants, P. 0. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 
B4145. 
J. VAL ROBERTS 
Attorney at Law 
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J. Val Roberts G2772 
Attorney Pro Se and 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Verle Roberts 
P. 0. Box 666 
Centerville, Utah 84014 
Telephone (801) 295-9003 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Fu6 I 5 1990 
Clerk, Suprecr^Couit u«J/ 




CENTERVILLE CITY, CENTERVILLE 
CITY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, and 
NANCY H. GRQLL, Chairman of 
the Centerville City Board of 
Adjustment, WILLIAM WINGQ, NORM 
WRIGHT, FRED NELSON, and DALE 
REES, members of the Centerville 




Civil No. 89-0903165 
COMES NOW, J, VAL ROBERTS, Attorney at Law, acting pro se anc 
as counsel for Coappel1 ant, VERLE ROBERTS, and hereby files a 
docketing statement in accordance with Rule 9(a) of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
1. The date of the order appealed from is January 2, 1990, 
wherein the HONORABLE DAVID E. ROTH, a Judge of the District Court 
of the Second Judicial District in and for Weber County, State of 
Utah, granted summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs' action 
against the Defendants for the unlawful taking of real property in 
connection with the Plaintiffs" prior existing, nonconforming use 
and from a parallel order for summary judgment against the 
Plaintiffs and in favor of the Defendant, BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT. 
EXHIBIT 2 
a-f-firrning the De-fendant Board's alleged right to determine the 
existence or nonexistence o-f the Plainti-f-fs' noncon-f orming use 
which, as construed, has denied the Plainti-f-fs the right to have a 
court o-f law determine whether or not the City ordinance grants 
the BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT the authority to determine, by hearing, 
the existence or nonexistence o-f any noncon-forming use within the 
con-fines o-f CENTERVILLE CITY by administrative review or whether 
the ordinance does not, in -fact, limit the authority o-f the BOARD 
OF ADJUSTMENT to receiving property owners" a-f-fidavits o-f 
noncon-f orming use and, therea-fter, recommending to the City 
Council which o-f the claims received by the BOARD should be 
litigated in the District Court. As applied, the summary judgment 
decision o-f the HONORABLE DAVID E. ROTH denies the Plainti-f-fs 
access to the District Courts o-f the State on substantial property 
issues and has permitted the De-fendant, BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, to 
acquire certain substantial property rights o-f the Plainti-f-fs 
without paying compensation in violation o-f the Constitution o-f 
the State o-f Utah and the Fi-fth Amendment o-f the United States 
Consti tution. 
2- The Order granting summary judgment -from which the 
Plaintiffs appeal places the Weber County Division o-f the Second 
District Court in the position o-f having a diametrically opposed 
conflict with a decision which has been the law in the Second 
District regarding inoperable, partially dismantled, and rusty 
automobiles owned by a private collector -for more then EIGHTEEN 
US) years, JUDGE THORNLEV K. SWAN o-f the Davis County Division 
o-f the Second District having rendered a decision against the CITY 
OF FARMINGTON, UTAH, and in -favor of MELVIN HELD, SR. regarding 
the alleged violation by MR. HELD o-f a FARMINGTON CITY ordinance 
enacted at substantially the same time and -form as the CENTERVILLE 
CITY ordinance complained o-f in the case at bar and purporting to 
modify the rights o-f the defendant/col lector to store antique, 
rusted, partially dismantled automobiles which were no longer 
manu-factured and which the defendant m the FARMINGTON CITY case 
brought onto the property at a time when it was zoned agricultural 
and did not specifically provide for the storing o-f "THREE (3) " 
antique automobiles as an accessory use to its agricultural 
classification. In re-fusing to take evidence and entering a 
summary judgment order in -favor o-f the Defendants, the Court has 
relied upon a case -from the State o-f Colorado, there being no such 
cases in Utah, and has, thereby, substantially changed the legal 
precedent relied on by Plaintiffs for EIGHTEEN (18) years in 
assembling their private collection of automobiles, established a 
conflict between two divisions of the same district court on 
identical facts, and abused its discretion by not conducting a 
hearing on the issues of fact that exist. 
3. The Plaintiffs in the case at bar have detrimentally 
relied upon the law as it has existed in the southern portion of 
the Second Judicial District since first taking note of the 
newspaper accounts of JUDGE THORNLEY l< . SWAN on August 16, 1971, 
and subsequent there unto in that the Plaintiffs have assembled 
some 30 collector's automobiles having a value in their restored 
condition in excess of $250,000.00 and will be deprived of 
substantial property rights unless the District Court is reversed. 
(See Exhibit "A," newspaper article.) <NOTE also additional 
newspaper articles citing the ruling by JUDGE THORNLEY K. SWAN o-f 
the Second District Court will be supplied as an additional 
exhibit to this Docketing Statement.) 
4. The Lower Court's abuse o-f discretion in granting the 
Defendants summary judgment has, as to the Plainti-f-fs in the case 
at bar, denied them the rights and bene-fits con-ferred upon other 
citizens o-f the State o-f* Utah under the Utah Horseless Carriage 
Act, Section 41-21-1 UCA 1954 as amended 1975 and will, i-f not 
reversed by this Honorable Court, deny the Plainti-f-fs the right to 
continue to store a 1941 Ford -flathead V-8 pickup truck and a 
1954 -flathead V-S one-ton truck on their property until such time 
as the Plainti-f-fs shall render the same operation. The -full text 
o-f the Statute invalidated as to the Plaintit-fs by the Court's 
summary judgment order is set out hereafter: 
41-21-1. "Utah Horseless Carriage" 
de-f i ned. 
"Any motor vehicle which is thirty 
years or older, -from the current year, 
primarily a collector's item, and used 
-for participation in club activities, 
exhibitions, tours, parades, occasional 
transportation, and similar uses, but 
which is not -for general daily 
transportation, shall, -for the purposes 
o-f this act, be known as a "'Utah 
Horseless Carriage." 
41-21-2. "Registration—fees-A-f-f idavi t-
-A-f-fidavit—Certi-ficate—License plates. 
" (1) In lieu o-f the annual 
registration -fees levied in Section 
41-1-127, the registration -fees -for any 
"Utah Horseless Carriage" shall be *10, 
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but no annual renewal of registration 
shall be required, "-***• 
5. The ordinance of CENTERVILLE CITY which is complained of 
in this appeal in its several versions which -forbid the storage o-f 
inoperable or partially dismantled or rusty motor vehicles, 
whether -for a period in excess o-f SEVEN <7) day or in excess o-f 
THIRTY (30) days, is unconstitutionally restrictive and over broad 
as it has been applied to the Plamti-f-fs in the case at bar. It 
cannot be seriously maintained by the Defendants, by the District 
Court Judge in the Lower Court, or by any mature person remotely 
-familiar with the construction, operation, or maintenance o-f 
either horseless carriages, antique cars, or classic automobiles 
such as the Plaintiffs' THREE (3) Karman Ghias that the same 
either can or should be stored and maintained in totally 
operational and rust iree condition for the THIRTY (30) years 
required by Section 41-21-1 UCA 1953 as amended 1Q75 while they 
are waiting to qualifv with the 30-year provision of the Statute 
even if the large quantities of road salt common in Utah during 
the winter months were not used in Centerviile. 
Cn The ordinance, as applied, not only negates the Statute 
but sets conditions which cannot be complied with in the year—to-
year ownership of the majority of foreign-made motor vehicles when 
parts must be shipped from Germany or Japan: and the same is 
unconstitutionally vague and over broad in its application to 
Plaintiffs. 
7. According to the published deposition of RANDY RANDALL, 
CENTEFVILLE CITY had never enforced its ordinance prohibiting the 
storage o-f rusted, inoperable, or partially dismantled vehicles 
against any o-f the citizens o-f the City until he was directed by 
the then City Council to initiate investigation and prosecution o-f 
the Plamti-f-fs in the case at bar by criminal action beginning in 
19B4 and being ongoing to the present, the Plamti-f-f, VERLE 
ROBERTS, having been -found guilty o-f violation o-f the ordinance by 
a Circuit Court Judge and subjected to a -fine o-f *100.00 
notwithstanding the sworn testimony that she owned none o-f the 
vehicles individually or jointly with the Plamti-f-f, J. VAL 
ROBERTS, and that she was incapable o-f criminal intent. So -far as 
is known to the Plamti-f-f/appel 1 ants in the case at bar, during 
the ensuing SIX <o) years "from the initiation o-f their prosecution 
to the present, no other person in the con-fines o-f CENTEPVILLE 
CI TV has been subjected to criminal sanctions -for the storage o-f 
rusted, inoperable, or partially dismantled vehicles 
notwithstanding the juaicial con-fession o-f CAFL F. ALLEN, JP. , at 
the Appellant. VEPLE POBEFTS^S, criminal trial that he had at that 
date, and had maintained -for the previous THREE (3) years, an 
inoperable and partially dismantled Honda motor vehicle on his 
property which property abuts the Plamti-F-f/Appel lants" property 
to the north. This Honorable Court should not only remand the 
F lainti-f-f /Appel 1 ants' civil action -for a -full evidentiary hearing, 
it should issue an injunction against the CITV as to the 
automobiles presently stored on the PI ainti-f-f/Appel lants^ property 
and any -further prosecution bv criminal action until this matter 
shall be resolved on its merits. 
-6-
8. In order -for a city zoning ordinance to be a valid means 
o-f limiting or extinguishing a nonconforming use, there must be 
some zone or location within the city which, by definition, 
permits the prior activity to be lawfully conducted. The 
published deposition o-f RANDY RANDALL states that there is no 
place in the City o-f Centerville where MR. ROBERTS may store his 
private collection o-f rusted, inoperable, or partially dismantled 
motor vehicles. The ordinance is, therefore, an unconstitutional 
taking o-f private property rights without compensation, and the 
ordinance is not constitutionally enforceable against any resident 
of the City in any of its prior or present forms. 
9. The actions of the Defendants in the case at bar 
constitute a de facto repeal of all of the ordinances dealing with 
the storage of partially dismantled, rusted, or inoperable 
vehicles within the confines of the CITY DF CENTERVILLE as well as 
selective prosecution by the CITY of the PIaintiff/Appel1 ants 
herein which, as applied, denies the Plaintiffs equal protection 
of the law guaranteed under both the United States and the Utah 
Constitutions; and this Honorable Court should not only vacate the 
District Court's permanent injunction and order on appeal, but 
should grant the Plaintiffs summary judgment against the 
Defendants as to the Plaintiffs'1 nonconforming use and the de 
facto repeal o-f the offending CITY ordinances. The Plaintiffs'" 
private collection of qualified horseless carriages and classic 
automobiles, while not a junkyard, constitutes the storage of 
inoperable and rusted motor vehicles within the view, as well as 
being within the boundaries o-F the distances prescribed by the 
State o-F Utah's Junkyard Control Statute as set out in Section 
27-12-137 o-f the Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended 1965 and 
27-12-137.3(3) o-f the Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended 1967-
(3) "Automobile graveyard'1 means any 
establishment or place o-f business which 
is maintained, used or operated, -for 
storing, keeping, buying or selling 
wrecked, scrapped, ruined or dismantled 
motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts-" 
H it is necessary or desirable to screen such rusted and 
inoperable motor vehicles -from public view, the authority to do so 
is granted to a city having such a -facility within its corporate 
limits provided the city enacts a valid ordinance which is uniform 
in its application to all similarly situated citizens. It could 
even regulate the maintenance o-f an existing storage area such as 
that owned by the PI ainti -f-f /Appel 1 ants in the case at bar -for 
years prior to the existence o-f such an ordinance. A myriad o-F 
Federal case law cited in ALR FOURTH establishes beyond dispute 
that a city must decide to either pay compensation to property 
owners 1-f i t chooses to en-force its ordinance or decline to 
enforce the ordinance all together. It must necessarily -follow, 
then, that even if the Lower Court's erroneous summary judgment 
ruling is allowed to stand, it was an error by the Lower Court not 
to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the value o-f the 
Plainti-f-f/Appellants* rights to exercise the incorporeal 
hereditaments o-F their fee simple whether or not the same was ever 
an accessory use in an agricultural zone, particularly where the 
published deposition o-f the City Zoning Administrator states that 
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no other citizens o-f the City o-F Centerville have had their rights 
to maintain inoperable, rusted, or partially dismantled motor 
vehicles on their land in-fringed upon by the enforcement o-f the 
ordinance against them at any time in the past, present, or 
•future. 
10. Plaintiff/Appellant., J. VAL ROBERTS, is informed and does 
believe that had the Lower Court conducted an evidentiary hearing, 
it would have determined that one of the several reasons why the 
CITY OF CENTERVILLE seeks to regulate no other property owner's 
maintenance of inoperable or partially dismantled automobiles on 
either their agricultural or residential property is that no other 
property owners have a collection of automobiles as substantial as 
that of the Plaintiff/Appellants on land that lies within less 
than 400 feet of a major access to Interstate Highway 15; and that 
both the enactment and the enforcement of the more recent 
ordinances limiting an individual's right to maintain rusted, 
inoperable, or partially dismantled vehicles on their property to 
a period not in excess of 30 days was solicited or suggested or 
encouraged by officials of District II of the Utah State 
Department of Transportation so as to avoid the application of the 
Federal Rules providing for screening of such storage areas. The 
District Court Judge's failure to take evidence on the major 
issues going to the bona fides of the CITY'S actions are a 
substantial abuse of discretion which can be verified by the 
testimony given by JAMES G- PARRISH at the hearing conducted by 
the CENTERVILLE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT which was made a part of the 
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record in the District Court. In that testimony, the -former 
Justice of the Peace stated, "If the Roberts's are in violation, 
so am I because I've had that old stationwagon out in my -field 
for years; and it is inoperable as well as rusty." 
11. The CITY OF CENTERVILLE is left with an ordinance which 
it may apply to the storage of rusted or inoperable motor vehicles 
which are kept at distances from freeway accesses which are 
greater than those prescribed by the applicable State Statute. 
The State of Utah has exercised its jurisdiction and has funded 
the screening of rusted and inoperable motor vehicles in 
Richfield, Utah, through the application of Federal grants 
specifically designated for this purpose. The 
Plaintiff/Appel1 ants in the case at bar have been denied, by the 
actions of the CITY OF CENTERVILLE, the protections of the State 
of Utah's Junkyard Control Act as well as the monetary benefits 
and physical improvements to the land which the 
Plaintiff/Appellants are using to store the Appellant, J. VAL 
ROBERTS'S, private collection of rusted and inoperable motor 
vehicles on the land owned jointly by the Plamti ff/Appel 1 ants in 
fee simple thereby unconstitutionally differentiateing between the 
Plaintiff/Appellant, J. VAL ROBERTS, and a similarly situated 
citizen of Richfield, Utah, upon whose land the State has built a 
12-foot high screening fence using Federal grants during the time 
that the case at bar has been working its way through the Justice 
of the Peace, Circuit, and District Courts. Inasmuch as district 
court judges, like ordinary citizens, are presumed to know the 
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Statutes o-f the State, it must be concluded that the HONORABLE 
DAVID E. ROTH, erred and exceeded his discretion in granting 
summary judgment to the Defendants in the case at bar when he 
re-fused to resolve these and other issues o-f -fact as well as the 
application o-f the Junkyard Control Act. The decision o-f the 
Lower Court should be reversed. 
12. The initiation o-f the prosecution o-f the 
Plaintiff/Appellants in the case at bar by the Defendant, CITY OF 
CENTERVILLE, beginning in approximately 1984 coincides more than 
coincidentally with Plaintiff/Appellant, J. VAL RQBERTSnS, refusal 
to donate to the CITY OF CENTERVILLE a portion of land four feet 
wide by 100 feet long upon which the Defendant CITY sought to 
place a public sidewalk under a State Department of Transportation 
Highway Public Safety Grant, the terms of which specifically 
precluded the Defendant, CITY OF CENTERVILLE, from applying any of 
the funds to the purchase of the additional four feet of 
right-of-way necessary to install the sidewalk and required 
retaining wails- Defendant, CITY OF CENTERVILLE'S City Manager, 
DAVID HALE, stated in the presence of both of the 
Plaintiff/Appellants and the Centerville City Attorney, KEITH M. 
STAHLE, that the City had never purchased right-of-way from 
citizens when mating public improvements, that MARILYN SHERIFF and 
other citizens were very angry that the Plaintiff/Appellants in 
the case at bar along with FIVE (5) of the Plaintiff/Appellants' 
neighbors would receive benefits valued in thousands of dollars 
which SHERIFF and others had been required to pay for as part of 
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an improvement district on the opposite side o-f State Highway 106 
utilizing right-of-way already owned by the State o-f Utah, HALE 
also stated that the City Council did not want to start a 
precedent o-f purchasing private property -for public use in such 
situations. Neither did the Council want to upset MARILYN SHERIFF 
and others by purchasing land -from the Plainti f -f /Appel lants in the 
case at bar. The ongoing attack by the Defendant, CITY OF 
CENTERVILLE, against PIaintiff/Appellants as individuals, as a 
married couple, and the involvement o-f the Plaintiff/Appel 1 ants' 
minor children by the officials o-f the City as guided by the 
suggestions o-f the District II Office o-f the State Department o-f 
Transportation and carried on to the present date by criminal 
in-formation signed by the current Justice o-f the Peace o-f the City 
o-f Centerville, who was a member o-f the City Council that directed 
Zoning Administrator RANDY RANDALL to investigate and follow up on 
the earlier prosecution, not only violates the 
Plainti -f-f /Appel 1 ants' rights to equal protection o-f the law, 
renders the ordinance unenforceable as applied, but is also a 
denial of the separation of powers doctrine as addressed by REX E. 
LEE5 former Solicitor General of the United States and former Dean 
of the B.Y.U- Law School, in Chapter 4 of his book, A_Lawyer_Lggks 
at_ t he_Con st it utign ;, published by the B.Y.U. Press and copyrighted 
in 1981. A copy of the most recent criminal information issued by 
the former City Council member against the Plaintiff/Appellant, J. 
VAL ROBERTS, is attached to this Docketing Statement as Exhibit 
"B. " 
13. De-Fendant, CITY OF CENTERVILLE, seeks to cause 
Plainti-f-f/Appellant, J, VAL ROBERTS, to -forfeit his accumulation 
o-f horseless carriages, antique automobiles, and classic cars as 
punishment -for -Failure to cooperate in a sidewalk sa-fety 
improvement project on State Road 106. The De-fendant, CITY OF 
CENTERVILLE, has consulted with and been guided by suggestions 
•from o-f-ficials within District II o-f the State Department o-f 
Transportation. The issues o-f -fact raised here would have been 
-fully addressed in an evidentiary hearing in the District Court 
but -for the Court's -failure to enter a proper ruling denying the 
De-fendant CITY'S motion -for summary judgment, and this Honorable 
Court should remand the matter -for such hearing as a part o-f its 
order. 
14. On at least THREE (3) prior occasions when 
Plainti-f-f/Appellant, J. VAL ROBERTS, has resisted donating land to 
the Citv or has represented clients against power-Ful departments 
o-f State Government or influential individuals, whether in 
administrative hearings or juvenile court, some governmental or 
guasi governmental agenc/ such as LEE FOFD o-f the Utah Attorney 
General's 0-f-fice, the Utah State Bar in the person o-f its -farmer 
Bar Counsel, now the HONORABLE PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, has initiated 
such things as letters -from the District Engineer threatening 
prosecution for maintaining a visual obstruction on a public 
highway or an uninvestigated and un-founded Bar Association 
complaint which, a-fter Plamti-f-f/Appel 1 ant retained eminent legal 
counsel, was dismissed as being un-founded, are more than 
su-f-ficient reasons why the un-favorable reflection on the -fair and 
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impartial administration o-f justice, the negative connotation 
which could be drawn -From the actions o-f the Plaintiff /Appel 1 ant" s 
professional association as well as the investigative skill and/or 
discretion o-f a sitting judge o-f the Appellate Court why this 
Honorable Court should place this matter under seal, should 
conduct any -future hearings in camera, and should not exercise its 
discretion to transfer the matter to the Utah Court o-f Appeals. 
15. Until such time as the Plamti ff/Appel lant, J. VAL 
ROBERTS, can secure -from his -former counsel, BRIAN M. BARNARD, the 
exhibits which will support the allegations o-f the previous 
paragraph as to himself, the PI amtiff/Appel lant, J. VAL ROBERTS, 
o-f-fers the -following observations -from current events. He is 
informed and does believe that other lawyers and judges whose 
actions have incurred the displeasure of persons with financial or 
political influence have, likewise, been subjected to complaints 
and other forms of intimidation; but he knows of no other person 
whose wife has been drawn into the attempt to limit his 
representation via criminal prosecution and the attempted 
destruction of the PIaintiff/Appel1 ants' marriage as in the case 
at bar. The unfounded complaint again SENATOR LORIN PACE for his 
vigorous representation in the Larsen bankruptcy and the unrefuted 
public comments of the HONORABLE DAVID S. VQUNG, a Judge of the 
Third Judicial District, to the effect that he had been threatened 
by other judges, legislators, an unspecified persons for his 
ruling on attorney's fees in the State thrift case are only two 
(2) of the more recent examples which would justify the Utah 
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Supreme Court in retaining jurisdiction of this matter and in 
placing the entire -file under seal and conducting hearings on 
motions which may hereafter be -filed in camera. Such is the 
request of the Plaint if f/Appel lant, J. VAL ROBERTS. 
Dated this 15th day of February, 19?<X" \ . 
J./J/AL ROBERTSx 
At torney a t Law 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DOCKETING STATEMENT, postage prepaid,, this day of 
, 1990, to the following: Jody Burnett and Daniel 
D. Hill, Attorneys for Defendants, P. 0. Box 45000, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84145. 
J.; VAL" ROBERTS "~ 
Attorney at Law 
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1 2 1 DESERET NEWS, W.dn.idoy, Augwt 18, 1971 •A 
Town Order* Removal Of Antique Autos 
By WANDA 1<UND 
Deseret News Staff Writer 
FARMINGTON — A man 
*ho ha* been collecting an-
tique automobiles since 1939 
has been ordered to rid him-
self of the old vehicles before 
Aug 28. 
He is Melville B. Held Sr., 
ft. 547 N Main, who has col-
lected 22 Model A Fords and 
numerous other old auto-
mobiles He keeps 20 of h 1 a 
Model As on his Farmington 
property, a 1 Vi acre lot 
When he first came to 
FrrminRion in 1941 he had al-
read) collected a 1923 Essex, 
a 192.1 Packard Phaeton and a 
1914 DeSoio Airflow, and be 
has added to this collection 
oxer the years. 
•*l ve been notified by letter 
that I must get rid of {be ob-
solete vehicles' 1 have or I 
will be fined or put In Jail," 
he said " I won't pay a fine 1 
will let them put me In Jail, 
i f I have to, I will get 
enough licenses to put on that 
whole string of cars," he said. 
" I am going to keep my 
Model A V 
He said fee has a special 
An Eyesore? Farmington says so, and has ordered owner to remove cars. 
fondness for the cars and 
never wants to sell them "as 
long as I have enough to eat 
"When 1 get hungry, 111 sell 
them," he said. 
He was told In a form letter 
that Farmington City has had 
a zoning ordinance since De-
cember, 1957, and t h a t he 
would have to get rid of his 
obsolete cars. 
"This ordinance was adopt 
ed for the express purpose of 
insuring that the community 
would grow In an orderly 
fashion and that the beauty 
and desirability of Farmington 
would be constantly im-
proved," the letter aaid in 
part 
Held retained an attorney to 
represent his Interests. In a 
letter to Jay Johnson, city 
zoning administrator, the at-
torney, Bill Thomas Peters, 
said the Held family had 
moved onto the property No-
vember 15, 1941 with three 
cars and had continu 
quire other vehidi 
then -
"The ordinance 
seek to enforce agf 
Held was not passec 
years and one month 
time that Mr lit 
menced using his la 
manner above descr 
wrote 
"Under the law, 
opinion that Mr He 
nonconforming use, t 
nonconforming use 
scribed as the use o 
building thrit existe 
uhrn the zoning i 
became effective an<1 
continued to exist c 
time 
"The action vou 
take against Mr I 
been held to be a vi 
constitutional rights 
tected by the UniM 
Constitution and cer 
protected by the Oc 
of the State of Utah ' 
He said zoning o 
must permit the coi 
of nonconforming use 
tente at the time 
nance was enacted. 
FEB - 8 BPO 
£xW;b}4 " 8 " 
THEODORE E. KANELL (1768) 
HANSON, EPPERSON fc SMITH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephones (801) 363-7611 
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J. VAL ROBERTS 
499 North Main 
Centerville, Utah 84014 
Defendants. 
INFORMATION 
Criminal No.: 89-0668 
On this 1st day of February, 1990, before me, Jerald L. 
Jensen, Justice of the Peace within and for Centerville City, 
Davis County, State of Utah, personally appeared Randy Randall 
who being duly sworn by me, on his oath, complains and says that 
the Defendant, J. Val Roberts on the 29th day of June, 1987, and 
every day thereafter until December 31, 1988 at Centerville City, 
Davis County, Utah did commit the offenses of violating Section 
10-354 (as it amended 7-5-4) Code of Revised Ordinances of 
Centerville, 1985 Revision, as follows, to-wit: 
That the said J. Val Roberts at the times mentioned 
above and at two locations within the boundary limits of 
Centerville City, 499 North Main (more particularly described ast 
Beginning at a point 406 feet North from the Southeast Corner of 
Lot lf Block *B" Big Creek Plat, Centerville Townsite Survey and 
running thence North 89 feet} thence West 262.41 feet; thence 
South 89 feet; thence Bast 262.41 feet to the point of 
beginning) and 59 Vest 550 North (more particularly described as 
followst All of Lot 27, Meadow Spring Subdivision, Plat "B", a 
subdivision of part of Section 7, Township 2 North, Range 1 Bast, 
Salt Lake Meridian), Centerville City did: 
1. Park, store, leave, or permit parking, storing, or 
leaving any motor vehicle of any kind which is in an abandoned, 
wrecked, dismantled, inoperative, rusted, junked, or partially 
dismantled condition whether attended or not for more than seven 
days, as more particularly described in Centerville City Code 10-
354 • 
Each of the above violations occurred on every day 
during the period before mentioned on each parcel of property and 
each day of occurrence constitutes a separate violation for each 
parcel of property all contrary to the provisions of the Revised 
Ordinances aforesaid, in such cases made and provided, and 
against the peace and dignity of Centerville City. 
2 
Witnesst Randy Randall, Kevin Taylor, Richaard Leonard, 
Carl Allen, Glen Crosby, John Toronto, and David Bales. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before ms this l*A day of 
^..Ui^yL . 1990. 
ft nr-fli \ m 
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